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Federal Public Law and the Future of
Oil and Gas Drilling on the Outer
Continental Shelf
David Pettit* and David Newmant
I. INTRODUCTION
Transocean's Deepwater Horizon offshore drilling rig, on lease
to BP, exploded and caught fire on April 20, 2010. This event
caused the deaths of eleven workers and resulted in an oil geyser
that spewed millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.' The
Deepwater Horizon sank two days after the explosion. Nearly
three months later, on July 15, 2010, BP was finally able to cap
the well.2 The Flow Rate Technical Group, a group of scientists
from federal agencies and academic institutions, estimated that
* David Pettit, a 1975 graduate of UCLA Law School, is a Senior Attorney for
the Natural Resources Defense Council. He is an environmental law litigator
who has been involved in the aftermath of the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon
oil spill. David would like to thank Rebecca Wolitz, Yale University Law
School, J.D. expected 2012, for her contributions to this piece.
f David Newman is an Oceans Program Attorney for the Natural Resources
Defense Council, and has been involved in BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill
litigation.
1. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF
OFFSHORE DRILLING vi (2011), available at http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/FinalReportlntro.pdf [hereinafter COMM'N
REPORT].
2. As this article is being written, crude oil has been reported on the
surface of the Gulf above the site of the wreckage of the Deepwater Horizon
drilling rig. This may be leakage from the rig or its components, or in the
worst case may be leakage from the seafloor around the capped well.
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BP's well dumped 4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of
Mexico. 3 This is roughly nine times the size of the Exxon Valdez
spill in 1989.
This toxic disaster resulted in "roughly 580 miles of oiled
shoreline4 and massive oil plumes beneath the sea's surface.5
Some scientists have found these plumes to be as big as ten miles
long, three miles wide, and 300 feet thick.6 Others have
documented a plume twenty-two miles long and 650 feet high.7
Many, including President Barack Obama, have called this oil
spill the worst environmental disaster in U.S. history:
Already, this oil spill is the worst environmental disaster
America has ever faced. And unlike an earthquake or a
hurricane, it's not a single event that does its damage in a
matter of minutes or days. The millions of gallons of oil
that have spilled into the Gulf of Mexico are more like an
epidemic, one that we will be fighting for months and
even years.8
This spill has had heart-wrenching implications for the
people, animals, and ecosystems of the Gulf. In human costs,
there has been death, physical injuries, damages to health, and
economic devastation to industries dependent upon a clean Gulf,
such as tourism, hospitality and fishing.
The Gulf of Mexico is a vibrant, albeit fragile, ecosystem. It is
home to several endangered and threatened species, including at
least five species of whale, five types of sea turtles, four kinds of
beach mice, four species of marine birds, and West Indian
3. Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of
Its Kind, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, at A14.
4. Campbell Robertson & John Collins Rudolf, Cleanup and Questions
Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at A16.
5. See, e.g., David Biello, Massive Oil Plume Confirmed in Gulf of
Mexico, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article.cfm?id=masive-oil-plume-confirmed-in-gulf-of-mexico.
6. Justin Gillis, Giant Plumes of Oil Forming Under the Gulf, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 2010, at Al.
7. WHOI Scientists Map and Confirm Origin of Large, Underwater
Hydrocarbon Plume in Gulf, WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INST. (Aug. 19,
2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=51334&tid=282&cid=
79926&ct=162.
8. Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill, WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE PRESS SEC'Y (June 15, 2010, 8:01 PM), http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill.
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manatees. Critical habitat has been designated for three of these
species.9 In addition, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service,
under the Department of the Interior, has identified at least
thirty-eight endangered or threatened species that it believes
could potentially be impacted by an oil spill in the Gulf.'0
As President Obama noted, the ramifications of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill will persist well into the future. Over
a year after the spill, significant impacts on endangered and
threatened species are still being uncovered. Injured or dead
animals attributable to the spill are continually being found."
Moreover, recent studies suggest that the casualties of affected
animals are vastly undercounted, particularly regarding deceased
whales and dolphins that perished as a result of the spill.12
In response to the Deepwater Horizon spill, the current
Administration has taken several steps towards gathering
information and shoring up regulatory weaknesses. These include
the "dissolution" of Minerals Management Service (MMS) and the
creation of Bureau of Ocean Energy Management and Regulation
(BOEMRE), and the Council on Environmental Quality's review of
agency policies under the National Environmental Policy Act. A
major contribution has been President Obama's establishment of
the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling (Commission). The Commission is an
independent, nonpartisan entity charged with providing a
thorough analysis of the causes of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster, an assessment of the oil industry's ability to respond to
spills, and recommended reforms for making offshore drilling
safer.13 The Commission issued its final report on January 11,
9. See Endangered and Threatened Species and Critical Habitats under
the Jurisdiction of the NOAA Fisheries Service: Gulf of Mexico, NAT'L
OcEANic & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/endangered
%20species/specieslist/PDF2010/Gulfi,20of%20Mexico.pdf (last visited Oct.
30, 2011).
10. Wildlife Threatened on the Gulf Coast, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.
(June 2010), http://www.fws.gov/home/dhoilspill/pdfs/NewWildlifeOfGulf.pdf.
11. See, e.g., Sea Turtle Deaths Up, Joining Dolphin Trend, MSNBC
(Mar. 30, 2011, 10:43 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42322119/ns/
usnews-environment/.
12. See, e.g., Jennifer Viegas, Whale, Dolphin Deaths in Gulf Spill
Underestimated, DISCOVERY NEWS (Mar. 30, 2011, 9:50 AM),
http://news.discovery.com/animals/gulf-deaths-underestimated-110330.html.
13. Weekly Address: President Obama Establishes Bipartisan National
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2011, in which it reached numerous conclusions and offered
several recommendations regarding offshore oil activities in the
Gulf of Mexico.14 As of this writing, none of the Commission's
recommendations has been acted on.
The Deepwater Horizon spill raises many deep and important
questions about our values as a nation, the kind of tradeoffs
between these values we are willing to accept,15 and our vision for
the future of our nation's energy supply. Given our nation's
current and unsustainable trajectory of oil consumption, it is
unlikely that drilling operations in the outer continental shelf
(OCS) will cease. Indeed, many have suggested that drilling in
these areas will only increase over time.16  Oil companies are
pushing, and will continue to push into deeper and deeper waters,
seemingly constrained only by technological and economic
limitations.
An article about regulating oil and gas drilling on the OCS17
could approach this topic from any number of orientations - for
example, focusing on employee safety or corporate liability. This
article's focus, however, will be on environmental regulations at
the front end of oil and gas drilling. A constellation of federal laws
and a complicated nexus of federal agencies are responsible for
regulating the oil and gas permitting process on the OCS. This
collection of laws and agencies is something of a morass.
Consequently, this article will first attempt to map out in a
coherent way those laws and agencies charged with regulating oil
and gas drilling on the OCS. It will then turn to the efforts the
Administration has made in the wake of the spill and discuss the
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling,
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE PRESS SEC'Y (May 22, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-
establishes-bipartisan-national-commission-bp-deepwa; see also COMM'N
REPORT, supra note 1.
14. See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at vii.
15. Drilling in the outer continental shelf implicates considerations of
national security, natural resource development, present and future public
and environmental health, and federalism-just to name a few.
16. See e.g. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 294.
17. The outer continental shelf "consists of the submerged lands, subsoil,
and seabed, lying between the seaward extent of the States' jurisdiction and
the seaward extent of Federal jurisdiction." The Outer Continental Shelf,
OCS ALTERNATIVE ENERGY & ALTERNATE USE PROGRAMMATIC EIS,
http://ocsenergy.anl.gov/guide/ocs/lindex.cfm (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
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hopes of the authors for the safety of future oil and gas drilling on
the OCS.
II. THE CURRENT FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY REGIME
There are a number of sometimes-overlapping federal statutes
that govern oil and gas drilling on the OCS. We will discuss these
below.
A. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)
Pursuant to OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356A, the Secretary
of the Interior puts out to bid leases to develop oil and gas deposits
in the OCS. Oil and gas exploration in the OCS is governed by a
five-step process: (1) the Secretary's promulgation of a five-year
leasing program, 8 (2) lease sales,19 (3) exploration,20 (4)
development and production, 21 and (5) sale of recovered oil and
gas.22
Before a leaseholder may commence exploratory drilling, it
must submit an exploration plan (EP) to BOEMRE for approval.23
The Secretary may allow exploration to proceed only if he or she
finds that the lessee's plan "will not be unduly harmful to aquatic
life in the area, result in pollution, create hazardous or unsafe
conditions, unreasonably interfere with other uses of the area, or
disturb any site, structure, or object of historical or architectural
significance."24 BOEMRE reviews the EP, and the application is
deemed "submitted" when it "fulfills requirements and is
sufficiently accurate," and the applicant has "provided all needed
additional information."25  BOEMRE then must approve,
disapprove, or require the lessee to modify an EP within thirty
days of when it was deemed submitted to the agency.26
18. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006).
19. Id. § 1337(a)(1).
20. Id. § 1340(a)(1).
21. Id. § 1351(a)(1).
22. Id. § 1353(a)(1).
23. See id. § 1340(c)(1).
24. Id. § 1340(g)(3); see also id. § 1340(g)(1)-(2).
25. 30 C.F.R. § 250.231(a) (2011).
26. Id. § 250.233.
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B. Oil Pollution Act of 1990
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) was passed in response to
the Exxon Valdez accident. Among other things, it requires
companies to address procurement, logistical, and deployment
challenges related to spill response. 27  It requires plans for
"ensur[ing] that containment and recovery equipment as well as
response personnel are mobilized and deployed at the spill site."28
The OPA also provides for a no-fault liability scheme and gives the
federal government the right to direct and, if necessary, take over
cleanup efforts from the "responsible party" who is, under OPA,
obligated to clean up an oil spill.
C. Coastal Zone Management Act
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) was enacted in
1972 and is found in 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451 to 1466. Among the
purposes of the CZMA is "to preserve, protect, develop, and where
possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation's
coastal zone for this and succeeding generations."29 The CZMA,
with which compliance is voluntary, is designed to encourage the
coastal states to develop and implement coastal zone management
plans that are then reviewed and approved by the federal
government. When an offshore oil spill occurs, conflicts can occur
between a federally-approved coastal zone management plan and
the spill cleanup and restoration actions taken under other federal
laws.
D. National Environmental Policy Act
Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act
27. See id § 254.23 (operator must describe emergency response action
plan procedures it expects to follow in the event of a spill or a substantial
threat of a spill); id. § 254.24(a) (requiring an "inventory of spill-response
materials and supplies, services, equipment, and response vessels available
locally and regionally").
28. Id. § 254.23(g)(5); see also id. § 254.26 (requiring detailed discussion
of worst case discharge scenario, including a discussion of the response in
"adverse weather conditions" that must include a "description of the response
equipment that [the operator] will use," with "the types, location(s) and
owner, quantity, and capabilities of the equipment," and estimates of the
time needed for procurement and deployment of equipment and personnel).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1452(1) (2006).
2012] 189
190 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:184
(NEPA) to "promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment... ."3o To achieve this goal, NEPA
requires federal agencies to fully consider and disclose the
environmental consequences of an agency action before proceeding
with that action.31  Agencies' evaluation of environmental
consequences must be based on scientific information that is both
"[a]ccurate" and of "high quality."32 In addition, federal agencies
must notify the public of proposed projects and allow the public
the chance to comment on the environmental impacts of their
actions.33  General regulations for implementing NEPA are
promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), an
executive branch office. 34
The cornerstone of NEPA is the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS). An EIS is required for all "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."35
The EIS must "provide [a] full and fair discussion of significant
environmental impacts and shall inform decision-makers and the
public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or
minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human
environment." 36
Under NEPA, an agency or project proponent may in certain
limited circumstances produce a lesser form of environmental
review, called an Environmental Assessment (EA). NEPA also
allows for what are called "categorical exemptions" for projects
that are not likely to have any significant effects on the
environment. As we will discuss below, prior to the Deepwater
Horizon disaster, the federal government regularly gave
categorical exemptions to OCS drilling projects.
An agency must prepare a supplemental EIS (SEIS) when
"rt]here are significant new circumstances or information relevant
to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or
30. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
31. See id. § 4332(2)(C); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2, 1502.5 (2011).
32. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b).
33. See id. § 1506.6.
34. See The Council on Environmental Quality - About, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/about (last visited Nov. 4,
2011).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see also, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (explaining under
what circumstances an EIS must be prepared).
36. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1.
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its impacts."37 "The standard for determining when an SEIS is
required is essentially the same as the standard for determining
when an EIS is required."3 A SEIS is necessary if there have
been changes in the project since the original EIS that "will have a
'significant' impact on the environment that has not previously
been covered by the [original] EIS."39 The agency must "take a
'hard look' at the new information to assess whether
supplementation might be necessary."40 Whether new
circumstances are significant depends on a number of factors,
including "[t]he degree to which the proposed action affects public
health or safety," "[t]he degree to which the possible effects on the
human environment are highly uncertain or involve unique or
unknown risks," and "[t]he degree to which the action ... may
cause loss or destruction of significant scientific, cultural, or
historical resources."41
NEPA regulations do not allow an agency to "commit
resources prejudicing selection of alternatives before making a
final decision... ."42 As a result, while an agency is in the process
of preparing a SEIS to evaluate the impacts of a proposed action,
it may not take any "action concerning the proposal ... which
would ... [h]ave an adverse environmental impact; or ... [1]imit
the choice of reasonable alternatives."43
E. Endangered Species Act
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act (ESA), in part,
"to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such
endangered species and threatened species."4 Principal
responsibilities for implementing the requirements of the ESA
have been delegated to the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), an
37. Id. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii).
38. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1215-16
(11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. at 1216 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
40. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 72-73 (2004).
41. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(2), (5), (8).
42. Id. § 1502.2(f).
43. Id. § 1506.1(a).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).
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agency within the Department of the Interior, and to the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), an agency within the
Department of Commerce. FWS is primarily responsible for
implementing the ESA for terrestrial species and a limited
number of marine mammals, and NMFS is primarily responsible
for implementing the ESA for most other marine species.45
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), provides
that "[elach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with
the assistance of [NMFS and FWS1, insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification" of those species' designated "critical habitat."46
Agency actions subject to this requirement include licenses,
contracts, and leases.47
Action agencies must engage in formal consultation with
NMFS or FWS whenever their actions may affect a listed
species. 48 Formal consultation is required if an agency action may
result in "[any possible effect [to listed species or critical habitat],
whether beneficial, benign, adverse, or of an undetermined
character. .. ."49 If, on the other hand, the action agency
concludes that the action is not likely to have an adverse effect
and NMFS and FWS concur in writing with that determination,
then consultation may proceed informally. 50
Formal consultation concludes with the issuance of a
NMFS/FWS biological opinion (BiOp), which includes an
assessment of the effects of the action on listed species and critical
habitat and a conclusion as to whether the agency action is likely
to jeopardize a listed species or destroy or adversely modify a
critical habitat for that species. 5 1 If jeopardy or adverse
modification is not likely to occur, the BiOp must include an
"incidental take statement" (ITS) covering any potential take of
45. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (2010).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
47. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02(c).
48. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a).
49. Interagency Cooperation - Endangered Species Act of 1973, as
Amended; Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,949 (June 3, 1986) (codified at
50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
50. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(k)(1).
51. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3).
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listed species likely to occur as a consequence of the action.52
Take of any endangered or threatened species in the absence of an
ITS is prohibited under ESA section 9 and its implementing
regulations. 53
An agency's duty to ensure against jeopardy or adverse
modification continues after the completion of section 7
consultations. The action agency must provide periodic progress
reports to NMFS and FWS covering impacts on and take of listed
species as specified in the ITS.54 Moreover, this duty to ensure
against jeopardy is ongoing: the action agency must immediately
reinitiate consultation with NMFS or FWS "[ilf the amount or
extent of taking specified in the incidental take statement is
exceeded" or "[ilf new information reveals effects of the action that
may affect listed species or critical habitat in a manner or to an
extent not previously considered."
While formal consultation is underway, both the federal
agency and the applicant are barred from making any
"irretrievable commitment of resources with respect to the agency
action" at issue.56  More specifically, after initiation of section
7(a)(2) consultation, the Federal agency and the permit or license
applicant "shall not make any irreversible or irretrievable
commitment of resources with respect to the agency action which
has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implementation of
any reasonable and prudent alternative measures which would
not violate subsection (a)(2)."57
F. Marine Mammal Protection Act
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was adopted
more than thirty years ago to ameliorate the consequences of
human impacts on marine mammals. Its goal is to protect and
promote the growth of marine mammal populations "to the
greatest extent feasible commensurate with sound policies of
resource management" and "to maintain the health and stability
52. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4), (o); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(1).
53. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C), (g).
54. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i)(3).
55. Id. § 402.16(a)-(b).
56. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d).
57. Id.
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of the marine ecosystem."58 A careful approach to management
was necessary given the vulnerable status of many of these
populations (a substantial percentage of which remain endangered
or depleted) as well as the difficulty of measuring the impacts of
human activities on marine mammals in the wild. 59  [I]t seems
elementary common sense," the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries observed in sending the bill to the floor,
that legislation should be adopted to require that we act
conservatively - that no steps should be taken regarding
these animals that might prove to be adverse or even
irreversible in their effects until more is known. As far as
could be done, we have endeavored to build such a
conservative bias into the [MMPA].6 o
The heart of the MMPA is its so-called "take" prohibition, a
moratorium on the harassing, hunting, and killing of marine
mammals by any private or public party.6' Under the law, the
NMFS (or the FWS) may grant exceptions to the take prohibition,
on application from a government agency or third party, for small
numbers of marine mammals, provided it determines, using the
best available scientific evidence, that such take would have only
a negligible impact on marine mammal populations and stocks.
There are two types of general exemptions available through the
MMPA for activities that incidentally take marine mammals: five-
year permits and one-year incidental harassment authorizations.
Regardless of which process is used, NMFS must prescribe
"methods" and "means of effecting the least practicable adverse
impact" on protected species as well as "requirements pertaining
to the monitoring and reporting of such taking."62
The MMPA prohibits, in most circumstances, the "take" of a
marine mammal without a permit from the Secretary of
Commerce. 63 The term "take" is defined broadly to include acts of
harassment, which are in turn defined to include acts of "torment"
58. Id. § 1361(6).
59. Id. § 1361(1), (3).
60. H.R. Rep. No. 92-707 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144,
4148.
61. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (take prohibition); see also id. § 1362(13)
(defining "take").
62. Id. § 1371(a)(5)(A)(i).
63. See id. § 1371(a); 50 C.F.R. § 216.107.
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or "annoyance" that "ha[ve] the potential to injure a marine
mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild" or have the
potential to "disturb" them "by causing disruption of behavioral
patterns, including, but not limited to, migration, breathing,
nursing, breeding, feeding, or sheltering."64
G. National Marine Sanctuaries Act
When amending the National Marine Sanctuaries Act
(NMSA) in 1996, Congress noted that "[o]ne of the greatest long-
term threats to the viability of commercial and recreational
fisheries is the continuing loss of marine, estuarine, and other
aquatic habitats. Habitat considerations should receive increased
attention for the conservation and management of fishery
resources of the United States."65 Thus, one of the purposes of the
NMSA is "to promote the protection of essential fish habitat in the
review of projects conducted under Federal permits, licenses, or
other authorities that affect or have the potential to affect such
habitat."66
To fulfill the substantive purposes of the NMSA's protections
for essential fish habitat, federal agencies are required to engage
in consultation with NMFS "with respect to any action authorized,
funded, or undertaken, or proposed to be authorized, funded, or
undertaken, by such agency that may adversely affect any
essential fish habitat. ... 67 Likewise, NMFS has a mandatory
duty to recommend "measures that can be taken by [an] agency to
conserve" essential fish habitat whenever NMFS receives
information "that an action authorized, funded, or undertaken, or
proposed to be authorized, funded, or undertaken by any State or
Federal agency would adversely affect any essential fish
habitat ... ."68
The essential fish habitat (EFH) regulations 6 9 outline the
process for federal agencies, NMFS, and the fishery management
councils to satisfy the EFH consultation requirement under
section 305(b) of the NMSA. As part of the EFH consultation
64. Id. § 1362(18).
65. Id. § 1801(a)(9).
66. Id. § 1801(b)(7).
67. Id. § 1855(b)(2).
68. Id. § 1855(b)(4)(A).
69. 50 C.F.R. §§ 600.905-600.930 (2011).
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process, when an agency action may adversely impact EFH, the
regulations require federal action agencies to prepare a written
EFH assessment describing the effects of that action on EFH.70
All EFH assessments must include the contents stated in 50
C.F.R. § 600.920(e)(3); however they may be incorporated into
documents prepared for other purposes (such as NEPA
documents).7n
III. THE FUTURE OF DRILLING ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF:
THE ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF DEEPWATER
HORIZON
A. CEQ Review of NEPA Policies
In response to the oil spill, the CEQ issued a report in August
of 2010, reviewing 1MS's NEPA policies. 72 In the report, the
CEQ stated that NEPA requires a thorough and meaningful
consideration of environmental impacts and mandates public
participation in this process:
NEPA was designed to ensure the consideration of
environmental impacts as part of the Federal
Government's decisionmaking. As President Obama
proclaimed upon NEPA's 40th Anniversary on January 1,
2010, "NEPA elevated the role of environmental
considerations in proposed Federal agency actions, and it
remains the cornerstone of our Nation's modem
environmental protections." NEPA was designed to
impart transparency and accountability in Federal
decisionmaking....
As explained below, 1MS conducted numerous levels of
extensive environmental reviews, relying upon the
"tiering" process-a process generally sanctioned in the
governing regulations for NEPA, in which prior reviews
70. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.920(e)(1).
71. Id. § 600.920(f).
72. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, REPORT REGARDING THE MINERALS
MANAGEMENT SERVICE'S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT POLICIES,
PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES AS THEY RELATE TO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100816-ceq-
mms-ocs-nepa.pdf [hereinafter CEQ REPORT].
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are incorporated into subsequent, site-specific analyses-
to consider the environmental impacts of its OCSLA
permitting decisions. This process was not transparent,
however, and has led to confusion and concern about
whether environmental impacts were sufficiently
evaluated and disclosed. It is essential to ensure that
information from one level of review is effectively carried
forward to-and reflected in-subsequent reviews, that
the agencies independently tests [sic] assumptions, and
that there is appropriate evaluation of site-specific
environmental impacts. As a result of this transparent
integration and incorporation by reference,
decisionmakers and the public will fully understand the
environmental consequences of the agency's decisions. 73
CEQ criticized MMS for freely using categorical exemptions
for OCS drilling permits, and noted that BOEMRE "ha[d]
committed to using the following CEQ recommendations as
guideposts as it continues its reform and reorganization
activities":
Perform careful and comprehensive NEPA review of
individual deepwater exploration, operation,
development, production, and decommissioning activities,
including site-specific information where appropriate....
Ensure that NEPA analyses fully inform and align with
substantive decisions at all relevant decision points; that
subsequent analyses accurately reflect and carry forward
relevant underlying data; and that those analyses will be
fully available to the public.
Ensure that NEPA documents provide decisionmakers
with a robust analysis of reasonably foreseeable impacts,
including an analysis of reasonably foreseeable impacts
associated with low probability catastrophic spills for oil
and gas activities on the Outer Continental Shelf....
Consider supplementing existing NEPA practices,
procedures, and analyses to reflect changed assumptions
and environmental conditions, due to circumstances
73. Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted).
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surrounding the BP Oil Spill. 74
B. New Safety Rules
After the BP incident, BOEMRE adopted a number of new
safety rules.7 5  These rules include the requirement for
"independent third party verification that the blind-shear rams [in
subsea blowout preventers] are capable of cutting any drill pipe in
the hole under maximum anticipated pressure."76  This is
particularly important given BOEMRE's finding that the blowout
preventer on the Deepwater Horizon rig failed.77
BOEMRE also issued a new rule requiring realistic worst-case
scenarios for OCS well blowouts.7 8  This has led to some
horrifically high estimates 79 that have led to litigation over what
is perceived to be inadequate assessment of the risk of blowouts
and of the oil companies' ability to contain them.8 0
C. Supplemental EIS for the Western Planning Area
On November 10, 2010, BOEMRE issued a notice of intent to
prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS)
for Western Planning Area Lease Sales 218 and 222 in the 2007-
2012 5-Year OCS Program.81 Among other things, this SEIS was
74. Id. at 4-5.
75. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENTERGY MGMT., REGULATION, & ENFORCEMENT,
THE DRILLING SAFETY RULE: A INTERIM FINAL RULE TO ENHANCE SAFETY
MEASURES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 1,
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfn?csModule=
security/getfile&PageID=45792 (last visited on Dec. 22, 2011).
76. Id.
77. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENTERGY MGMT., REGULATION, & ENFORCEMENT,
REPORT REGARDING THE CAUSES OF THE APRIL 20, 2010 MACONDO WELL
BLOWOUT 198 (Sept. 14, 2011), available at http://www.boemre.gov/
pdfs/maps/dwhfinal.pdf.
78. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERTY MGMT., REGULATION, & ENFORCEMENT,
NATIONAL NOTICE TO LESSEES & OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL & GAS LEASES,
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS) 1-2 (June 18, 2010), available at
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/201ONTLs/10-nO6.pdf
79. See David Pettit, Feds Issue First New Deepwater Drilling Permit In
the Gulf of Mex., SWITCHBOARD: NAT'L RES. DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG (Mar.
21, 2011), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/dpettit/fedsissuefirstnew-
deepwater.html.
80. Enviros Challenge Shell's Gulf Deepwater Drilling Permit, ENV'T
NEWS SERV. (June 13, 2011), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jun20l1/2011-
06-13-092.html [hereinafter Enviros Challenge].
81. See Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), Western and Central Plannning
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designed to supplement the multi-sale EIS for the area where the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill occurred. The notice of intent stated
the following rationale for supplementing the current EIS:
A SEIS is deemed appropriate to supplement the NEPA
documents cited above for these lease sales in order to
consider new circumstances and information arising,
among other things, from the Deepwater Horizon blowout
and spill. The SEIS analysis will focus on updating the
baseline conditions and potential environmental effects of
oil and natural gas leasing, exploration, development, and
production in the [Western Planning Area] and [Central
Planning Area]. 82
BOEMRE's supplemental EIS was circulated in August
2011.83 It contains several of the flaws of the prior EIS, including
an understatement of the risk of another BP-sized blowout and an
unjustified reliance on unproven subsea capping methodologies
championed by industry.
D. New EAs
On October 12, 2010, BOEMRE issued an Environmental
Assessment analyzing the potential impact of lifting a suspension
of drilling operations in the Gulf that involved the use of a subsea
blowout preventer or a blowout preventer on a floating drilling
facility (Suspension EA). In this document, BOEMRE admitted
that "[blaseline environmental conditions in the Gulf of Mexico
have been substantially affected from the impacts of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill" and that it was unsure about the
extent of that harm.84 In particular, BOEMRE noted that
Areas, Gulf of Mexico (GOM) Oil and Gas Lease Sales for the 2007-2012 5-
year OCS Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,122, 69,122 (Nov. 10, 2010).
82. Id.
83. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION & ENFORCEMENT,
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR PROPOSED WESTERN
PLANNING AREA OCS OIL & GAS LEASE SALE 218 (Aug. 2011), available at
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2011/2011-034-vl.pdf.
84. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION & ENFORCEMENT,
MODIFICATIONS TO SUSPENSION OF DEEPWATER DRILLING OPERATIONS:
ENVIRONMENTAL. ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF No SIGNIFICANT IMPACT 10 (Oct.
12, 2010), available at http://www.boemre.gov/eppd/PDF/EAModifications
Suspension10122010.pdf [hereinafter SUSPENSION EA].
2012]1 199
200 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITYLAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:184
Consensus information on the magnitudes of these
impacts, the length of time needed for baseline conditions
to be restored to conditions existing prior to the
Deepwater Horizon spill, and the magnitude of impacts
that would be expected if another catastrophic spill
occurred while baseline conditions are still recovering
from the Deepwater Horizon is largely unavailable at this
time although progress is underway toward answering
these questions.85
BOEMRE also noted that "[a] catastrophic spill has the
potential to cause significant impacts to marine and coastal
biological habitats and resources in the Gulf of Mexico, as well as
direct impacts to individual organisms."86 It described how the
Deepwater Horizon spill had both identified a number of risks
from offshore drilling and called into question some of BOEMRE's
prior assumptions about the potential risks:
[T1he Deepwater Horizon spill has demonstrated that a
high-volume, extended-duration spill resulting from a
blowout has the potential to result in impacts that could
affect the long-term population status of biological
resources over extended areas ....
... Marine mammals have been observed swimming in oil
after spills. Therefore, it cannot be assumed they would
avoid the impacted area. The oil could harm marine
mammals through several ways, including, but not
limited to, the breathing of fumes from the oil (and
possibly dispersants), persistence on their skin, and the
consumption of oiled food sources....
Sea Turtles: The majority of sea turtles impacted by the
Deepwater Horizon event have been Kemp's ridleys,
listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA). Shoreline oiling and efforts may affect future
population levels and reproduction....
Coastal Habitats: During the spill, over 500 miles of
shoreline were impacted, varying from light to moderate
to heaving oiling. The majority of the Gulf coast is
85. Id.
86. Id. at 20.
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sensitive shoreline types (i.e., sheltered tidal flats;
vegetated low banks; salt/brackish-water marshes;
freshwater marshes/swamps; scrub-shrub wetlands) that
tend to accumulate oil and are difficult to clean, causing
oil to persist in coastal and estuarine areas. Loss of
vegetation could lead to erosion and permanent land loss.
Coastal and Marine Birds: The Gulf coastal habitats are
essential to the annual cycles of many species of breeding,
wintering and migrating waterfowl, wading birds,
shorebirds, and songbirds. The spill and response
activities could interfere with migration. The worst
impacts to oiled birds, or those which have ingested oil
with their prey, would be if the oil spill occurs during the
nesting season. An oil spill could result in the loss of
entire colonies of breeding birds on barrier islands
surrounded by oil, along with the loss of all eggs and
nestlings.
Fisheries: A catastrophic spill has the potential to cause
the loss of a year class (fish in a stock born in the same
year), affecting future stock populations....
... With the oiling over 500 miles of shoreline, it is
foreseeable that an entire critical habitat for a species
with a relatively small critical habitat could have been
completely oiled. For example, the endangered Alabama
beach mouse (Peromyscus polionotus ammobates) only
has 1,211 acres of frontal dunes covering just ten miles of
shoreline designated as critical habitat.8 7
In addition, BOEMRE acknowledged that exploratory drilling,
regardless of the depth, poses a greater risk of a catastrophic oil
spill than does development drilling since it involves "drill[ing]
into formations for which there is limited knowledge of the
wellbore parameters."88
This sense of uncertainty about the potential risks to the Gulf
from exploratory drilling was echoed in another EA, which
BOEMRE issued in September 2010 in conjunction with its
publication the following month of an Interim Final Rule
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implementing increased drilling safety measures for the Gulf
(Safety EA). The Safety EA noted that the measures would be
likely to improve well control reliability but that it could not
determine the degree of improvement.89 In the Safety EA,
BOEMRE described the same risks from an oil spill that it
detailed in the Suspension EA.90 Disappointingly, despite this
lack of certainty about the benefits from the Interim Final Rule
and other safety measures, BOEMRE concluded in the Suspension
EA that "the occurrence of potential effects from oil spills has been
effectively reduced by these improvements. . . ."91
Despite the Administration's pervasive uncertainty about the
environmental impacts that have arisen in light of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill, BOEMRE continues to accept and approve
exploration plans (EPs), development and production plans
(DOCDs), and applications for permission to drill (APDs) in the
Gulf of Mexico. Even several weeks after the oil spill began, MMS
had approved over twenty exploration plans for drilling in the
Gulf, apparently without initiating consultation regarding
possible effects on endangered species. 92 Not only were the plans
approved, but MMS exempted all of these exploration plans from
having to conduct a more stringent environmental review, opting
instead to grant them categorical exclusions.9 3
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill not only altered the baseline
conditions for the Gulf of Mexico offshore marine and coastal
environments, it also dramatically altered assumptions regarding
both the risk and the likely environmental consequences of a
major blowout and oil spill:
In the past five years, the share of the Gulfs production
89. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT. REGULATION & ENFORCEMENT,
INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF, FOR 30 CFR PART 250: ENVIRONMENTAL. ASSESSMENT
AND FINDING OF No SIGNIFICANT IMPACT 7 (Sept. 2010), available at
http://www.boemre.gov/eppd/ PDF/EAInterimSafetyRule.pdf [hereinafter
SAFETY EA].
90. See id. at 14-16.
91. SUSPENSION EA, supra note 84, at 23.
92. See Marian Wang, After Spill, More Gulf Drilling Plans Got
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from ultra-deep wells, wells deep[er] than 500 feet,
climbed from 1% to 32%. But ultra-deep water drilling
creates special risks, including that which appears to
have been the primary cause of the Deepwater Horizon
tragedy, [an] uncontrolled blowout. These risks were
there to be seen but were largely unprepared for or
ignored by both government and industry.... It is clear
that the move to [d]eepwater represents an enormous
change in US energy exploration. Unfortunately, our
government and industry did not undergo a similar
transformation in its regulatory, safety, and response
focus. We need such a shift now and today we will be
hearing information to guide our thinking about what it
should be.94
Similar concerns over deepwater drilling95 are also expressed in
the CEQ Report:
As oil exploration and production moves further offshore,
with an increasing number of [wells] drilled in deeper
waters with more complex technologies and concomitant
risk, BOEM recognizes that the basis for a categorical
exclusion for these deepwater activities needs to be
reexamined in light of the increasing number of
deepwater wells drilled over time.96
Despite these well-founded concerns, BOEMRE has recently
approved a number of exploration permits in the Gulf through
EAs that downplay the risk and consequences of another large oil
spill. 97 BOEMRE is also taking steps to allow new exploratory
94. Regulatory Oversight of Offshore Drilling: Hearing Before Nat'l
Comm'n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling (Meeting
2),(Aug. 25, 2010) (statement of Former Sen. Bob Graham), available at
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Transcript-
%20Meeting%202.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Former Sen. Graham].
95. The significant individual and cumulative risks of offshore
exploration and development are not limited to deepwater drilling. The
Santa Barbara blowout in 1969, the 1979 Ixtoc I blowout in Mexico and the
2009 Montara blowout in Australia all took place in shallow water.
96. CEQ REPORT, supra note 72, at 30 (citation omitted).
97. BOEMRE has a notoriously difficult website to navigate, but
information on recent EPs can be found at: http://www.bsee.gov/Regulations-
and-Guidance/ Permits/Status-of-Gulf-of-Mexico-Well-Permits.aspx.
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drilling off the coast of Alaska.98
E. Reinitiation Letters
On July 30, 2010, in response to the Deepwater Horizon
disaster, BOEMRE requested that NMFS and FWS reinitiate
consultation under section 7(a) of the ESA on the effects of the
Five Year Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Program
(2007-2012) in the Central and Western Planning Areas of the
Gulf of Mexico. 99 BOEMRE explicitly stated that:
[T]he [Deepwater Horizon] incident and the resulting oil
spill necessitate this reinitiation action. . . . [W]e
acknowledge that the spill volumes and scenarios used in
the analysis for the existing NMFS [BiOp] need to be
readdressed given the "rare event" of a spill exceeding
420,000 gallons as referenced in the current NMFS
[BiOp] has occurred and that affects [sic] to and the
status of some listed species or designated critical
habitats may have been altered as a result of the
[Deepwater Horizon] incident and therefore require
further consideration.' 1
NMFS responded to this letter on September 24, 2010, agreeing
that reinitiation was warranted. In this response, NMFS
explicitly noted that:
As our response and impact analysis [regarding the spill]
continues, it is a good time for BOEM to evaluate the
impacts to endangered and threatened species, and
designated critical habitat from the oil, as well as for any
potential future spills. We have begun synthesizing data
98. See Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation &
Enforcement, BOEMRE Issues Conditional Approval for Shell Exploration
Plan for Beaufort Sea (Aug. 4, 2011), available at http://www.boemre.gov/ooc/
press/2011/press0818a.htm; Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt.,
Regulation & Enforcement, BOEMRE Releases Final Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement for Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 193 (Aug. 18,
2011), available at http://www.boemre.gov/ooc/press/ 2011/press08O4a.htm.
99. See Letter from Joseph A. Christopher, Reg'1 Supervisor, BOEMRE,
to Roy E. Crabtree, Reg'1 Adm'r Se. Region, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.
(July 30, 2010), available at http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sf/deepwater-
horizon/BOEMRERequest June_302010.pdf
100. Id.
OIL AND GAS DRILLING
from the spill, and it is clear that we have
underestimated the size, frequency, and impacts
associated with a catastrophic spill under the 2007-2012
lease sale program. The size and duration of the MC 252
spill were greater than anticipated, and the effects on
listed species have exceeded our projections. Due to the
takes of sea turtles from the oil, a new effects analysis
and jeopardy analysis for listed species will need to be
completed.
. . . The previous environmental impact statement did
not estimate the size of a catastrophic spill and NMFS
relied on historical data and other assumptions to
estimate the potential size and impacts of such a spill on
listed species. In light of the ongoing investigations
surrounding the MC 252, we believe these assumptions
did not sufficiently address the potential risks of a spill of
this magnitude occurring and the risks posed to listed
species and their habitats.
The risk of oil spills, oil and gas industry response
activities, and the potential impacts on protected
resources should be comprehensively analyzed and the
potential effects to listed species and critical habitat re-
evaluated.101
F. National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling
As noted above, the Commission published a lengthy report 02
on the BP oil spill. Here are its conclusions:
* The explosive loss of the Macondo well could have been
prevented.
* The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can
be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP,
Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such systematic
101. See Letter from Roy E. Crabtree, Reg'1 Adm'r, Se. Region, Nat'1
Marine Fisheries Serv. to Joseph A. Christopher, Reg'1 Supervisor, Minerals
Mgmt. Serv. (Sept. 24, 2010), available at http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sf/
deepwater horizon/NMFS ResponseSeptember_24_2010.pdf.
102. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1.
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failures in risk management that they place in doubt the
safety culture of the entire industry.
* Deepwater energy exploration and production,
particularly at the frontiers of experience, involve risks
for which neither industry nor government has been
adequately prepared, but for which they can and must be
prepared in the future.
* To assure human safety and environmental protection,
regulatory oversight of leasing, energy exploration, and
production require reforms even beyond those significant
reforms already initiated since the Deepwater Horizon
disaster. Fundamental reform will be needed in both the
structure of those in charge of regulatory oversight and
their internal decisionmaking process to ensure their
political autonomy, technical expertise, and their full
consideration of environmental protection concerns.
* Because regulatory oversight alone will not be
sufficient to ensure adequate safety, the oil and gas
industry will need to take its own, unilateral steps to
increase dramatically safety throughout the industry,
including self-policing mechanisms that supplement
governmental enforcement.
* The technology, laws and regulations, and practices for
containing, responding to, and cleaning up spills lag
behind the real risks associated with deepwater drilling
into large, high-pressure reservoirs of oil and gas located
far offshore and thousands of feet below the ocean's
surface. Government must close the existing gap and
industry must support rather than resist that effort.
* Scientific understanding of environmental conditions in
sensitive environments in deep Gulf waters, along the
region's coastal habitats, and in areas proposed for more
drilling, such as the Arctic, is inadequate. The same is
true of the human and natural impacts of oil spills. 0 3
The Commission also published 60 pages of recommendations,
including these:
103. Id. at vii.
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* Engage a competent, independent engineering
consultant to review existing regulations for adequacy
and "fit for purpose" as a first step toward benchmarking
U.S. regulations against the highest international
standards. Following this review, develop and implement
regulations for safety and environmental protection that
are at least as rigorous as the regulations in peer-oil-
producing nations. A new regulatory entity for safety and
environment (as described below) should ensure that
while engaged in petroleum activities all drilling and
production platforms are certified and operating at the
highest level of international regulatory practice.
* Require operators to develop a comprehensive "safety
case" as part of their exploration and production plans-
initially for ultra-deepwater (more than 5,000 feet) areas,
areas with complex geology, and any other frontier or
high-risk areas-such as the Arctic. In addition, for lease
sales in those and other areas, prospective lessees should
be required to demonstrate competence, based on
experience, financial capacity, and expertise, as a
prequalification for bidding.
* Expand Safety Environmental Management System
requirements to include regular third-party audits at
three- to five-year intervals and certification. These
plans should be expanded for frontier areas to encompass
the full range of risk assessment and management.
* For both new and transferred leases, require the
operator to participate in a new safety institute or agree
to expert audits, and to contribute to safety and
environmental research and development. Approval to
transfer leases sold prior to this requirement should be
conditioned on the new requirements based on risk
factors related to the specific requirements of the lease.
The lease stipulation should also include the requirement
that the operator possess adequate capability to contain
and respond to an oil spill, and sufficient financial
capacity to compensate for damages caused by a spill.
* To cultivate and maintain government expertise on
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offshore drilling safety:
(1) Establish a process under the auspices of the National
Academy of Engineering to identify criteria for high-risk
wells and develop methodology to assess those risks. This
process should include, to the extent that the National
Academy deems appropriate, input from experts in the
U.S. Geological Survey, the Department of Energy, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and
academia. Furthermore, the Department of the Interior
should develop in-house competence to perform such
sophisticated risk assessments. Such evaluations could
guide the transition to a system where all operators and
contractors are required to demonstrate an integrated,
proactive, risk management approach prior to leases
being granted or receiving permits for exploration wells
and major development projects. As noted above, these
efforts should initially focus on areas with complex
geology, ultra-deep water, and any other frontier or high-
risk areas-such as the Arctic.
(2) Establish a coordinated, interagency research effort to
develop safer systems, equipment, and practices to
prevent failures of both design and equipment in the
future. The federal government has relevant expertise in
areas such as the application of remote sensing and
diagnostics, sensors and instrumentation, and command
electronics that could and should be transferred to the
offshore industry....
* Develop more detailed requirements for incident
reporting and data concerning offshore incidents and
"near misses." Such data collection would allow for better
tracking of incidents and stronger risk assessments and
analysis. In particular, such reporting should be publicly
available and should apply to all offshore activities,
including incidents relating to helicopters and supply
vessels, regardless of whether these incidents occur on or
at actual drilling rigs or production facilities. In addition,
Interior, in cooperation with the International Regulators
Forum, should take the lead in developing international
standards for incident reporting in order to develop a
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consistent, global set of data regarding fatalities, injuries,
hydrocarbon releases, and other accidents. Sharing
information as to what went wrong in offshore operations,
regardless of location, is key to avoiding such mistakes.
* Lead in the development and adoption of shared
international standards, particularly in the Gulf of
Mexico and the Arctic. Transparent information and data
sharing within the offshore industry and among
international regulators is critical to continuous
improvement in standards and risk management
practices. The United States shares the waters of the
Gulf of Mexico and its sub-surface resources with Cuba
and the Republic of Mexico. After many decades of
declining investment and production in the Mexican part
of the Gulf by PEMEX, the national oil company, a recent
Mexican Supreme Court ruling has created the
opportunity for U.S. and other foreign oil and gas
companies to enter Mexican waters. PEMEX has
indicated its intention to auction deepwater contracts
beginning in 2012. Separately, Cuba has already leased
blocks 50 miles off the coast of Florida with reported
plans for seven exploration wells by 2014. Agreement on
standards for operations should be part of any negotiation
to define the maritime boundary between the United
States, Mexico, and Cuba in the eastern Gulf of Mexico.
The need for international standards for activities in the
Arctic is also unquestioned: the United States having
already awarded leases in the region and now it is
incumbent on the United States to push for such
standards.
*Provide protection for "whistleblowers" who notify
authorities about lapses in safety. All offshore workers
have a duty to ensure safe operating practices to prevent
accidents. To ensure all workers, regardless of employer,
will take appropriate action whenever necessary,
Congress should amend the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act or specific safety statutes to provide the same
whistleblower protection that workers are guaranteed in
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other comparable settings.104
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: HOPES FOR THE FUTURE OF OIL AND GAS
DRILLING ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
In a world more perfect than ours, citizens of the United
States would, in light of significant environmental concerns such
as climate change and toxic oil spills, dramatically reduce their oil
consumption. In such a world politicians would fight for
renewables and clean technology not only because their engaged
constituents demand nothing less, but because the costs of
maintaining the status quo are unacceptable. President Obama's
recent fuel efficiency deal suggests that our world might be
beginning to take first steps towards approximating these
ideals. 0 5
Yet, as noted above, BOEMRE has issued many new permits
for drilling in the Gulf, and two for drilling exploratory wells in
the Arctic Ocean.106  For the immediate future, America's
dependence on oil provides a strong economic and political
incentive for continued oil and gas drilling on the OCS. As the
President's Commission has observed:
Offshore oil and gas will continue to be an important part
of the nation's domestic energy supply for many decades.
Offshore wells yield one-third of current U.S. oil
production, and in recent decades helped offset declines
in production elsewhere in the United States (U.S.
production peaked in 1970). That already-crucial role is
likely to increase. The area of federal jurisdiction, the
outer continental shelf, contains an estimated 85 billion
barrels of oil in technically recoverable resources-more
than all onshore resources and those in the shallower
state waters combined. The future of domestic oil
production will rely to a substantial extent on current
outer continental shelf sources and further development
of deposits there-in progressively deeper, more distant
104. Id. at 5-6.
105. See Bill Viasic, Carmakers Back Strict New Rules for Gas Mileage,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2011, at Al.
106. John M. Broder & Clifford Krauss, U.S. Taking Step To Open
Drilling In Arctic Ocean, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, at Al.
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waters, and perhaps in such challenging environs as the
Alaskan Arctic. 0 7
Consequently, against this background, the authors hope that
oil and gas drilling on the OCS will be required to be as safe as
reasonably possible. That "[ilt can be done safely"10 8 is
insufficient. To that end, our hopes for regulatory reform echo
those demands for change issued by the President's Commission,
the Council on Environmental Quality, and numerous
commentators. Specifically, we ask that: (1) those charged with
the important task of permitting drilling operations on the OCS
faithfully adhere to the law; (2) that NEPA be interpreted,
reformed and implemented in a way that lives up to its
mandate;109 and (3) that the permitting process for oil and gas
will, going forward, involve more robust interagency collaboration
and oversight.
A. Litigation
Litigation has been filed challenging BOEMRE's approval of a
Shell deepwater exploration permit off the coast of Alabama. 110
The claims include: violation of NEPA for failing to perform an
EIS before approving the permit; violation of OPA for not properly
considering potential environmental damage; violation of ESA for
failure to consult with NMFS and failure to obtain a "take"
permit; and violation of MMPA for failing to properly assess
potential damage to whales and other marine mammals. There is
also pending litigation, on many of the same theories, challenging
BOEMRE's approval of sonic exploration in the Gulf - a process in
which arrays of air cannons are towed over sites of interest and
enormous blasts of sound, which are known to injure marine
mammals, are directed downwards to the seafloor. These cases
suggest that notwithstanding any need for reform BOEMRE
would do well to follow existing law in issuing exploration permits.
107. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 294 (footnotes omitted).
108. Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
109. CEQ REPORT, supra note 72, at 8 ("NEPA is a fundamental
decisionmaking tool used to harmonize our economic, environmental, and
social aspirations and is a cornerstone of our Nation's efforts to protect the
environment.").
110. See Enviros Challenge, supra note 80.
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B. NEPA Reform
In evaluating the regulatory failures that contributed to the
Deepwater Horizon spill, the Administration and commentators
have in particular focused on the reform of agency policies
surrounding NEPA.1' We agree with many of these proposals,
including: (1) a reevaluation, and we would argue elimination, of
the use of Categorical Exclusions for drilling on the OCS, (2)
reform of the OCSLA thirty-day turnaround period for exploration
plans, and (3) more rigorous NEPA analysis at various stages of
the leasing process. In particular, we believe that BOEMRE's use
of EAs instead of the more rigorous EIS to be problematic so long
as the EAs are based on unrealistic assumptions regarding the
probability of another large oil spill and on untested well-
containment systems.
1. Categorical Exclusions
Earnest calls for reform and information gathering followed in
the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.112 As a result of
these calls to action, BOEMRE itself conducted a variety of
inquiries into the environmental impact of deepwater drilling in
the Gulf. The result of this research was an acknowledgment of
pervasive uncertainty with respect to the complete environmental
impact of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and how future
111. See e.g. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 260 ("The Commission has
reviewed the leasing and permitting processes that MMS followed in the Gulf
of Mexico before the Deepwater Horizon incident. The results lead the
Commission to conclude that the breakdown of the environmental review
process for OCS activities was systemic and that Interior's approach to the
application of NEPA requirements in the offshore oil and gas context needs
significant revision.").
112. See e.g. Statement of Former Sen. Graham, supra note 94 ("In the
past five years, the share of the Gulfs production from ultra-deep wells, wells
deep[er] than 500 feet, climbed from 1% to 32%. But ultra-deep water
drilling creates special risks, including that which appears to have been the
primary cause of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, [an] uncontrolled blowout.
These risks were there to be seen but were largely unprepared for or ignored
by both government and industry.. . . It is clear that the move to [d]eepwater
represents an enormous change in U.S. energy exploration. Unfortunately,
our government and industry did not undergo a similar transformation in its
regulatory, safety, and response focus. We need such a shift now and today
we will be hearing information to guide our thinking about what it should
be.").
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accidents in the Gulf might impact the environment.
Baseline environmental conditions in the Gulf of Mexico
have been substantially affected from the impacts of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Consensus information on
the magnitudes of these impacts, the length of time
needed for baseline conditions to be restored to conditions
existing prior to the Deepwater Horizon spill, and the
magnitude of impacts that would be expected if another
catastrophic spill occurred while baseline conditions are
still recovering from the Deepwater Horizon is largely
unavailable at this time although progress is underway
toward answering these questions.113
BOEMRE noted that in contrast to smaller spills, "the
Deepwater Horizon spill has demonstrated that a high-volume,
extended-duration spill resulting from a blowout has the potential
to result in impacts that could affect the long-term population
status of biological resources over extended areas .... In
addition, multiple federally and state-listed, threatened and
endangered species have been impacted."1 l4 Moreover, BOEMRE
findings also included marine mammals breathing in toxic oil
fumes, endangered sea turtles facing reproductive failure, and the
possible loss of entire colonies of breeding birds.115
Against this background, categorical exclusions (CEs) have
been used in the central and western Gulf of Mexico to exempt
exploration or development plans from environmental review.116
Indeed, CEs were still being used by MMS several weeks after the
113. SUSPENSION EA, supra note 84, at 10.
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id.
116. Holly Doremus, Through Another's Eyes: Getting the Benefit of
Outside Perspectives in Environmental Review, 38 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV.
247, 266 (2011) ("No more NEPA analysis was undertaken. From 1986 until
after the Deepwater Horizon disaster, approvals of exploration or
development plans in the central and western Gulf of Mexico were covered by
a categorical exclusion. That categorical exclusion was never defended in a
public forum. On its web site, MMS offers a 'past performance' justification:
'hundreds of Environmental Assessments (EAs) were prepared for approval of
certain types of oil and gas exploration and development and production
plans in the central and western Gulf of Mexico. However, none of those EAs
identified the need to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).'").
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Deepwater spill." 7 A CE
refers to an activity that has been determined through an
appropriate public process not to raise environmental
issues or concerns which require analysis in an EA or
EIS. Once a CE is established, it can be applied to a
specific proposed action if there are no 'extraordinary
circumstances' that raise the potential for significant
impacts based on relevant site-specific analysis. 118
CEQ is careful to note that when these circumstances are met, "a
CE is an appropriate way to comply with NEPA."119 It also "does
not review every application of a CE, every agency project, or the
NEPA documents prepared for every agency decision. Rather,
CEQ reviews agencies' NEPA implementing regulations and
procedures, as well as agencies' overall program
implementation."120
In light of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, both the
President's Commission and CEQ have suggested that the use of
CEs for deepwater drilling projects be reassessed.121 Director
Michael Bromwich is currently reviewing the use of CEs
associated with offshore drilling activities, and has ordered the
suspension of CEs for activities involving subsea blowout
preventers (BOPs) and surface BOPs on floating facilities that
require an APD.122 We, however, take a stronger position. The
use of CEs for exploration and development plans in the Gulf is
117. See Wang, supra note 92.
118. CEQ REPORT, supra note 72, at 10.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 260-61; see also CEQ REPORT, supra
note 72, at 30 ("As oil exploration and production moves further offshore,
with an increasing number of [wells] drilled in deeper waters with more
complex technologies and concomitant risk, BOEM recognizes that the basis
for a categorical exclusion for these deepwater activities needs to be
reexamined in light of the increasing number of deepwater wells drilled over
time.").
122. See Memorandum from Michael R. Bromwich, Dir., Bureau of Ocean
Energy Mgmt., Enforcement & Regulation, to Walter Cruickshack, Deputy
Dir., Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Enforcement & Regulation, & Robert
LaBelle, Acting Assoc. Dir. for Offshore Entergy and Minerals Mgmt. (Aug.
16, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfin?
csModule=security/getfile&PageID=42011.
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more than "questionable."123 It is dangerous. To reiterate, CEs
may be applied only for actions that "do not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment"
and for which no "extraordinary circumstances" apply. 124
Offshore drilling is an inherently risky business. It is difficult
to identify any OCS exploration or sonic activities that are
appropriate for a CE, given that even in the absence of a
catastrophic oil spill there are significant impacts associated with
normal drilling operations, including noise, air, water pollution, as
well as seismic disturbance and increased vessel and air traffic.
2. Reform of OCSLA Thirty Day Turnaround for Exploration
Plans
Under OCSLA, the Secretary of the Interior has thirty days to
review exploration plans.125 As some have noted, "[alt this point
[in the process], government discretion is sharply constrained."1 26
The Secretary "cannot disapprove [the plan] unless it finds that
the proposed activities would probably cause serious harm or
damage to life, property, mineral resources, national security, or
the environment. If it disapproves an exploration plan, [the
123. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 261.
124. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2011).
125. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided in this
subchapter, prior to commencing exploration pursuant to any oil and gas
lease issued or maintained under this subehapter, the holder thereof shall
submit an exploration plan to the Secretary for approval. Such plan may
apply to more than one lease held by a lessee in any one region of the outer
Continental Shelf, or by a group of lessees acting under a unitization, pooling,
or drilling agreement, and shall be approved by the Secretary if he finds that
such plan is consistent with the provisions of this subchapter, regulations
prescribed under this subchapter, including regulations prescribed by the
Secretary pursuant to paragraph (8) of section 1334(a) of this title, and the
provisions of such lease. The Secretary shall require such modifications of
such plan as are necessary to achieve such consistency. The Secretary shall
approve such plan, as submitted or modified, within thirty days of its
submission, except that the Secretary shall disapprove such plan if he
determines that (A) any proposed activity under such plan would result in
any condition described in section 1334(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title, and (B) such
proposed activity cannot be modified to avoid such condition. If the Secretary
disapproves a plan under the preceding sentence, he may, subject to section
1334(a)(2)(B) of this title, cancel such lease and the lessee shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the regulations prescribed under section
1334(a)(2)(C)(i) or (ii) of this title.").
126. Doremus, supra note 116, at 260.
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Secretary] may choose to cancel the lease, provided it is willing to
compensate the lessee." 27
Even so, the President's Commission, CEQ, and the
Department of the Interior (DOI) have urged that Congress revisit
this thirty-day deadline and extend it to sixty days.128 CEQ has
referred to the thirty-day deadline as a "very short timeframe."129
Reviewing exploration plans is an important and time-consuming
task; thirty days is an insufficient amount of time to review these
plans with the level of detail and care that they require.130
Agency approval of exploration plans should not be merely a
rubber stamp. For these reasons, we agree that the thirty-day
deadline ought to be extended.
3. Use of EIS Rather Than EA For Exploration Permits
In our view, BOEMRE should not approve new exploration or
development plans in deep water without subjecting those plans to
a thorough NEPA analysis. BOEMRE, for instance, should not
rely on earlier Programmatic EIS, deepwater EA, or pre-
Deepwater Horizon lease sale NEPA documents in reviewing new
applications for EAs. The OCS drilling world completely changed
on April 10, 2010, and BOEMRE needs to come to grips with this.
The President's Commission has called for mandatory EISs
for "both the Five-Year Plan and for specific lease sales before
plans for exploration, development, and production are approved
in areas with complex geology, in ultra-deepwater, and in the
Arctic and other frontier areas." 31  It has also called for a
reduction in the size of land leased when an area has not yet been
127. Id. at 260-261 (footnote omitted).
128. See COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 262; CEQ REPORT, supra note
72, at 32.
129. CEQ REPORT, supra note 72, at 32 ("Both CEQ and DOI recognize
that the statutory requirement that the Secretary of Interior approve
Exploration Plans within thirty days, as set forth in the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), may impose constraints on the agency's ability to
undertake a more complete environmental review in every instance. That is
why the Administration has requested that Congress amend the OCSLA to
provide more time to conduct additional environmental reviews, when
appropriate. While BOEM should continue its efforts to secure relief from
this very short timeframe, even under current law rigorous NEPA analysis is
needed.") (footnote omitted).
130. Id.
131. COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 262.
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well explored, arguing that smaller leasing areas will provide a
better opportunity for sound assessment of the impacts of oil and
gas drilling. 132  To the extent that these suggested reforms
mandate a more rigorous environmental evaluation at each step of
the planning, leasing and permitting processes, we support these
proposals.
C. Interagency Oversight and Collaboration
Among its other recommendations, the President's
Commission urges increased collaboration between agencies
throughout the planning, leasing, exploration and development
processes of oil and gas drilling on the OCS. 133 In particular it
notes that NOAA, though possessing a wealth of expertise and
information pertinent to the environmental impacts of deepwater
drilling, is an untapped resource lacking, under OCSLA, an
effective voice.
In making leasing decisions, the Secretary is required to
solicit and consider suggestions from any interested
agency, but he or she is not required to respond to the
comments or accord them any particular weight. Similar
issues arise at the individual lease sale stage and at the
development and production plan stage. As a result,
NOAA-the nation's ocean agency with the most
expertise in marine science and the management of living
marine resources-effectively has the same limited role
as the general public in the decisions on selecting where
and when to lease portions of the OCS.134
We believe that this situation ought to change. Concentrating
power in the Secretary of the Interior to the extent that he or she
is not required by law to even respond to the comments and
concerns of other agencies, let alone, incorporate them into the
decision-making process, is seriously misguided.
As Professor Doremus has noted, many have called for the




135. Doremus, supra, note 116, at 251.
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Calls for unified environmental regulation and oversight
are common today, for good reason. Fragmentation of
authority and responsibility may mean that no one ever
takes a comprehensive view of the system, or that
agencies work at cross-purposes. It can bring
unnecessary duplication, with attendant inefficiencies.
More subtly, where multiple agencies share authority
over the multiple causes of an environmental problem,
each may be tempted to avoid taking politically difficult
steps to address it."136
Fragmentation of authority, importantly, also makes the system
more difficult to understand and navigate.
Yet, "[t]he Deepwater Horizon saga [I reminds us that
concentration of responsibility also has its downsides."137
Doremus persuasively highlights three reasons why interagency
oversight is important to the deepwater drilling regulatory
process. Review by others will: (1) "help counter 'mission agency
syndrome,' the tendency of agencies dedicated to a primary
mission to ignore or underplay anything that might conflict with
that mission"; (2) "reduce the impact of routinization . . . [that is
agencies] fall[ingl into 'rubber stamp syndrome,' recycling the
same analysis over and over again as boiler plate without serious
consideration"; and (3) "help ensure that environmental analysis
keeps abreast of technological changes, countering 'past
performance syndrome,' the tendency to assume that because
there has not been a problem in the past one will not occur in the
future."138
For these reasons not only should NOAA be granted a
stronger footing for commenting on leasing and other permitting
decisions, but NOAA should also be an active participant in these
processes with oversight (if not veto) authority. Drilling on the
Outer Continental Shelf raises unique environmental issues that
NOAA, perhaps of all the agencies, is best equipped to evaluate.
Participating in decision-making and having oversight
authority, however, is only part of the picture for effective
oversight. NEPA, ESA, and CZMA, for instance, offer many
136. Id. (footnotes omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 253.
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opportunities for consultation and oversight. Yet, these
opportunities did not prevent the Deepwater Horizon disaster
from occurring. Neither EPA, FWS, NMFS nor the State of
Louisiana questioned MMS' analysis at their respective parts of
the planning and leasing process. 139
It has been suggested that the convergence of a large amount
of paperwork to review and a lack of resources results in
ineffective oversight. Remedies for this problem, therefore,
include making important information of relevance to the
overseeing agency easier to find.
[TIhe attention of the reviewer needs to be captured and
focused on the salient issues. Agencies are chronically
short of resources and face many demands on their time.
Unless they understand the importance of their task in
the specific context, they may treat the review as a
matter of routine. Furthermore, reviewers should not
face unnecessary barriers to identifying the most
important or questionable elements of the analysis. 140
Access to technological expertise for evaluating salient
information is also crucially important.141 One easy step in this
direction would be for BOEMRE to clean up its nearly
impenetrable website.
Comprehensive implementation of constructive interagency
collaboration and oversight, therefore, will need to include not
only reform of the underlying frameworks that convey or restrict
outside agency authority (for example, under OCSLA), but also
substantive regulatory requirements that have strong logistical
effects. This will take Congressional action, which, so far, has
been lacking.
V. CONCLUSION
At a recent conference, we heard an oil industry
representative say that the way to honor the memories of the
eleven workers killed on the Deepwater Horizon was to keep
drilling for oil on the OCS. He could not have been more wrong.
139. Id. at 265-70.
140. Id. at 272 (footnotes omitted).
141. Id.
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The way to honor their memories is to make sure that an event
like the Deepwater Horizon fire and sinking never happens again.
In this article, we have offered our suggestions to make it so.
